Jus Post Bellum

Does it make sense to consider the morality of ending and exiting warfare?

This semester, I had the wonderful opportunity to take Prof. Hehir's "Politics and Ethics of the Use of Force" course jointly offered in the Kennedy School of Government and the Divinity School. Overall, the course taught on the history and application of Just War Theory (JWT) both historically and presently.

In its simplest (and I do mean simplest) form, JWT is comprised of two elements with a couple stipulations with each one. These are jus ad bellum (the morality of going to war) and jus in bello (the morality within warfare). Within these two are the principles of:

1. Just cause. One can (1) take life to defend life, (2) take life to prevent large-scale, systematic taking of life, and/or (3) take life to overcome a regime that oppresses life.

2. Proper authority. War can only be called by those in charge of nation-states.

3. Right intention. War cannot be enacted, for instance, to inflict revenge or obliterate a nation.

4. Last resort. War cannot be called unless it is absolutely necessary.

5. Moral possibility for success. Would warfare be feasible and successful?

6. Proportionality for war as a whole. Do not fight a war that causes more harm than that which you sought to overcome.

7. Noncombatant immunity. Civilians must never be targeted.

and finally

8. Proportionality in warfare. The use of arms must be proportional to the goals sought.

These eight principles have guided JWT for centuries since St. Augustine put pen down to paper. It has been only recently, however, that there has been a call from within the ethics and military community for a jus post bellum (JPB), a just end to a war. If the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught the international community anything, it is this: a terrible exit from war has both unethical and strategic consequences. Leaving a location before peace has been restored may leave a nation worse off than it was before.

What is more, this insecurity can serve to breed unrest that could instigate future warfare. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have had two phases. Other examples (such as the Treaty of Versailles that led to World War II or the terms of surrender for Japan by the U.S. that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs) come up as indicators of a need for a JPB.

So what does an ethical exit look like? And is it useful?

JPB is the topic of my final paper for the class, and I thought I'd just share some of the ideas that have been in my head as a result.

The earliest consideration for a JPB in the ethics literature in the U.S. and Western Europe comes from 1994. Although one of the big shots of JPB, Brian Orend, sees links going all the way back to Kant*, most of the authors on the topic cite literature that only spans the last two decades. In writing my paper, I found this absolutely incredible. JPB is an academic newborn, an idea that is still in diapers and learning to avoid the corners of coffee tables. How wonderful to encounter a topic still in an inchoate state!

Overall, the main principles have been best articulated by Orend in the book cited above. They include:

1. Just cause for termination. You have to have met the goals you sought out to reach.

2. Right intention. The exit must not contain punitive acts or those of revenge.

3. Public and legitimate. The end of war must be publicly announced by legitimate authorities involved.

4. Discrimination. Differentiate between political and military leaders, soldiers and civilians, in adjudicating post-war justice (which includes both monetary payments and war-crimes trials).

5. Proportionality. Terms of surrender, for instance, cannot be unconditional. And the human rights of fought nation must be respected.

Within all these principles are the practical realities of what they require. Reconstruction, for instance, both urban and political, is a necessary result of JPB. Celebrations are allowed, but they must follow right intention: the celebration of the end of warfare that also contains the conscious weight of the lives lost on both sides is different from celebrating the fall of another nation. Post-war cleanup of devices used during warfare (such as mines) is another requirement.

The authors I read gave insightful considerations for a JPB, but overall JPB remains an under-taught aspect of JWT. This is partly, of course, due to the fledgling nature of JPB. But could a robust JPB be useful both for ethicists and politicians in articulating or defining the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in a clearer light? Here are some thoughts:

1. A strong JPB can help limit warfare. War is a blunt instrument for politics. It takes a lot of money, a lot of lives, and a lot of time. What is more, it takes all three of these aspects well beyond the original measurements expected going into war. Thinking about our responsibilities after war, therefore, can give new meaning to the requirements of going to war and acting in war.

2. JPB can round out JWT. As it stands, JWT talks about the beginning and middle of warfare. But war has three parts: beginning, middle, and end. Why not have a clear look at all three aspects?

3. JPB can help preserve peace. Sometimes a good exit strategy can leave all nations better off than before. The goal is NOT to go to the status quo ante, which brought warfare in the first place. The goal is to leave all nations in better conditions so as to prevent future warfare.

There are, as well, some problems.

1. JPB can limit warfare where it's needed. Would a robust JPB actually inhibit intervention, for instance? Could JPB lead nations to reconsider actin in cases of internal strife? In effect, could a JPB lead to more Rwandas in the world?

2. Terrorism and alternate warfare. JPB in its present articulation views warfare in classic aggressor v defender terms. But what about non-state actors, such as terrorists? Does JPB require a defending nation to rebuild the country within which terrorists are hiding (especially if there are questions as to the complicity or relationship between the nation and the terrorist organization)?

3. When to call it quits. Peace is a finicky and difficult goal to achieve. At what point are reconstruction efforts completed? How far must one pursue war-crimes trials at the expense of peace? What, in short, are the practical limits for idealist outcomes?

Thank you for reading thus far. These are just some of the points that I have been considering, but I would love to hear your thoughts on the following questions:

Is there a necessity for jus post bellum, or is Just War Theory better of without it?

What parts are missing from the current jus post bellum?

What other problems might a jus post bellum pose, both ethically and practically?

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* Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000).